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“THOU SHALL NOT…(DIS)TRUST”: CODES OF CONDUCT AND 
HARMONIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS IN THE EU
PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS*
 1. Introduction
In 2002, the Commission in its report on “The State of the Internal Market 
for Services”,1 whi ch formed part of the internal market strategy for services 
adopted by the Commission in December 2000,2 was adamant about the n ever-
ending tale of completing the internal market for services. Complex regulatory 
barriers have been substituted for physical and technical barriers, thereby 
diminishing the possibilities for a genuine, integrated internal market for 
 services. And yet services account for two-thirds of total employment and 
for all new employment growth within the Union,3 while other studies praise 
the growth-generating effects and positive spillovers of services liberaliza-
 tion.4
 The EU as a block is the leading player in international trade in services 
with a surplus of €68.5 billion in 2006, representing a world share in trade 
in services of around 25 per cent.5 In business services, which incorporate 
* Assistant Professor of Law and Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg Uni-
versity, the Netherlands. An earlier draft of this paper was originally presented at the Modern 
Law Review Workshop on “The Regulation of Trade in Services: Trust, Distrust and Economic 
Integration” organized by the Centre for Law and Governance in Europe at University College 
London and the Centre for European Legal Studies at Cambridge University, London/Cam-
bridge, 30 June and 1 July 2009. I am grateful to the workshop participants as well as Petros 
Mavroidis, Aukje van Hoek, Vanessa Mak, Matteo Negrinotti, Linda Senden and the CML Rev. 
anonymous referees for stimulating discussions and thoughtful insights. Remaining errors are 
the author’s alone. Contact: p.delimatsis@uvt.nl.
1. European Commission, “The State of the Internal Market for Services”, COM(2002)441 
final, 30 July 2002.
2. European Commission, “Internal Market Strategy – Priorities 2003-2006”, COM(2003)238, 
7 May 2003. This strategy came as a response to the request by the Lisbon European Council in 
March 2000. See the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, para 17.
3. European Commission, “New European Labour Markets, Open to All, with Access for 
All”, COM(2001)116 final, 28 Feb. 2001.
4. Inter alia, Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian, “Measuring services trade liberalization 
and its impact on economic growth: An illustration”, 21 Journal of Economic Integration (2006), 
64–98.
5. Eurostat, Europe in Figures – Eurostat Yearbook 2008 (Luxemburg, 2008), p. 358. It bears 
mention that these data do not include sales of foreign affiliates, the so-called mode 3 under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
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professional services, the EU achieved a surplus of €31 billion in 2006, one 
of the highest scores that year. Outsourcing is one of the main reasons explain-
ing the sector’s rapid growth. Intra-EU trade in services, on the other hand, 
amounts to 57 per cent of total exports of services and accounts for one-
quarter of the global trade in services.6
 The fragmentation that characterizes the regulation of services supply within 
the European Union negatively affects the competitiveness of European firms 
and undermines the ambitious objective of the Union becoming the most 
 competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy worldwide (“Lisbon 
Strategy”). This is so because services play an essential role in the overall 
functioning of markets, since they underlie the relations between producers 
and consumers. Services are a crucial component of the information industry 
networks on which these relations between producers and consumers depend. 
Instantaneous interactive communication permits transactions in an increasing 
number of services to occur at the same time but in different places. This allows 
the previously indispensable requirement of proximity between consumer and 
service supplier to be overcome. and thus increases the tradability of services. 
Furthermore, the growing interpenetration of services and goods in the supply 
and demand cycles means that any policy seeking the optimal allocation of 
productive resources must now take into consideration regulatory issues in 
both goods and services.7
 The ad option of the Services Directive (hereinafter, “the Directive”) was 
the long-awaited EU reaction to this situation with a view to achieving more 
effective regulation of services supply within the Union.8 Earlier, the European 
Commission’s Proposal for a Services Directive (hereinafter “the Proposal”)9 
recogn ized the importance of trust in the achievement and the smooth function-
ing of a genuine internal market for services. The lack of trust reveals the 
absence of a “thinking European” mentality10 and is translated into protec -
tionist interests that foreclose foreign competition; negate the possibility of 
 comparison; and thus obliterate any motivation for domestic service suppliers 
6. Eurostat, “Statistics in Focus”, 57/2008.
7. Delimatsis, International Trade in Services and Domestic Regulations – Necessity, Trans-
parency, and Regulatory Diversity (OUP, 2007), pp. 62–63. For this intermingling, compare 
Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite Digital, [2002] ECR I-607, paras. 31–33. In the WTO context, 
see the recent Appellate Body Report, China – Audiovisual Products.
8. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2006 on 
Services in the Internal Market O.J. 2006, L 376/36. The Directive was to be implemented by 
Dec. 2009 at the latest. For a detailed account of the Directive, see Barnard, “Unravelling the 
Services Directive”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 323–394.
9. European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Services in the Internal Market”, COM(2004)2, 13 Jan. 2004.
10. European Commission report, cited supra note 1, 45.
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to improve their services.11 This lack of trust evidently affects consumer wel-
fare within the EU: static analyses have found that the removal of the country 
of origin principle from the Directive in its final form deprives the EU of an 
additional €2-4 billion p.a. or 10 per cent of the expected welfare gains 
 following the adoption of the Directive.12 
 In the absence of the country of origin principle, the creation of codes of 
conduct (CoC) at a European level as an alternative, soft method of progressive 
rule-making acquires new dynamics. The Directive regards the creation of 
pan-European CoC (dealing notably with issues such as commercial commu-
nications or rules of professional ethos) as a useful instrument13 that can be 
used to reinforce trust in the quality of qualification or licensing requirements 
and procedures of the other Member States.14 While they are soft-law instru-
ments, CoC partake in the effort to guarantee a high level of quality and safety 
commensurate with the ever-increasing expectations of the EU citizens. The 
objective remains to enhance trust among Member States regarding the equiv-
alence of services and service suppliers originating in other Member States. 
 This paper explores the impact of CoC on the liberalization of professional 
services using as a starting point the Directive and the continuing attempt to 
harmonize professional standards at EU level. Effective market access for 
service suppliers can depend heavily on such codes, which are typically adopted 
by non-State, self-regulated bodies, e.g. professional associations, sports fed-
erations etc. While such (mostly voluntary) rules of conduct are aimed to 
improve the quality of the services supplied by the professionals subject to 
such rules, they can nevertheless unduly hinder the intra-EU movement of 
professionals. Liberalization of factor mobility enshrined in primary and sec-
ondary EU law or agreed on during State-to-State negotiations at a multilateral 
11. For the positive effects of mutual trust more generally, see the seminal work by Fuku-
yama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Free Press, 1995).
12. See Copenhagen Economics, “The Economic Importance of the Country of Origin Prin-
ciple in the Proposed Services Directive”, 2005, 9 at <www.copenhageneconomics.com/Admin/
Public/Download.aspx?file=/Files/Filer/Publikationer/trade4.pdf> (last visited 30 Aug. 2009). 
In other studies, the negative effects of the non-incorporation of the country of origin principle 
appear to be even greater. See de Bruyn, Kox and Lejour, “The trade-induced effects of the 
 Services Directive and the country of origin principle” (CPB document No. 108, Feb. 2006), 42 
at: <www.cpb.nl/nl/pub/cpbreeksen/document/108> (last visited 30 Aug. 2009).
13. The other instruments are: (minimum or targeted) harmonization; administrative co-
operation and mutual assistance between national authorities; and (voluntary) measures promot-
ing the quality of services. See also the 7th recital of the Directive.
14. European Commission report, cited supra note 1, 4. Mutual trust can of course be 
enhanced through co-operation between Member States’ authorities or the use of electronic 
information systems such as the newly established Internal Market Information System (IMI). 
See European Commission Recommendation on measures to improve the functioning of the 
single market, O.J. 2009, L 176/17, Recital 9.
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level can be jeopardized by the adoption and application of such codes. Thus, 
CoC exemplify the collapse of the traditional public versus private divide; 
underscore the non-dichotomic reality that soft law developments imply; and 
ultimately raise thorny questions. 
 Part 2 critically analyses the meaning and the rationale of the mandate 
incorporated in the Directive calling for the creation of pan-European CoC and 
examines the possible content of such CoC. Part 3 places the mandate and the 
private sector involvement sought by the Directive within the broader context 
of the new legislative culture that the EU has adopted and which endorses 
alternative methods of regulation and soft law. The CoC-specific issues that 
can have an impact on the free movement rules are examined in Part 4, whereas 
Part 5 deals with the competition law issues that the application of CoC may 
raise and reviews the scope of the EU competition law rules as clarified by the 
voluminous ECJ case law. Part 6 concludes.
2. The mandate for the creation of pan-European Codes of Conduct 
2.1. Setting the scene: The Directive 
Services are more vulnerable to regulations impeding their supply. This chill-
ing effect is due to the peculiar nature of services: services are typically non-
tangible, non-storable, and above all heterogeneous, with limited possibilities 
of mass production. Thus, many of the most “effective” barriers to free move-
ment of services relate to the pre- or post-establishment of juridical and natural 
persons.15 In addition, quality, the “holy grail” of every law or regulation gov-
erning services, is closely intertwined with the characteristics, qualifications, 
experience and so forth of each individual service provider. This trait of ser-
vices regulation increases the transaction costs and undermines the pursuit of 
efficiency when regulating this highly heterogeneous sector of the economy.
 From an economic viewpoint, another important eccentricity of the nature 
of protection in services industries is that most of the barriers to trade in ser-
vices have characteristics akin to quantitative restrictions. This means that such 
barriers generate artificial scarcity, which in turn leads to inflated prices and 
hence the creation of economic rents. The creation of these economic rents 
induces incumbents to lobby to retain protection.
 The Proposal’s solution to this challenge was the country of origin principle, 
which would essentially create a presumption of equivalence among intra-EU 
15. Cf. Delimatsis, “Due process and ‘good’ regulation embedded in the GATS – Disciplin-
ing regulatory behaviour in services through Article VI of the GATS”, 10 Journal of Inter-
national Economic Law (2007), 16.
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service suppliers. The abolition of this principle from the final text of the 
Directive cynically demonstrates the absence of mutual trust in the current 
stage of European integration and how long and winding the road may be until 
mutual trust among the Member States is actually established. Services and 
service suppliers from other Member States are viewed with suspicion and 
considered as menacing the allegedly “exceptional” quality and safety of 
 services produced domestically.16
 The Directive ambitiously aims to eliminate remaining regulatory barriers 
to the achievement of the internal market in services, while ensuring legal 
certainty for service suppliers and consumers and setting the foundations for 
gradual trust-building.17 It adopts a horizontal approach based on the under-
standing that, while ubiquitous and diverse, several services sectors call for 
regulatory intervention to pursue a certain set of legitimate policy objectives 
which appear to be common to more than one sector, such as consumer protec-
tion, the integrity of the profession, or ensuring the quality of the service. 
 The objective of the Directive is to enable both service suppliers and con-
sumers to benefit from the fundamental freedoms guaranteed in Articles 49 
and 56 TFEU, that is, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services.18 In this respect, the Directive consolidates previous European Court 
16. This suspicion typically takes the form of systematic application of the host-country 
rules; the simple evocation of “general good” objectives to justify obstacles, without verifying 
the equivalence of the protection in the country of origin or the proportionality of the restriction; 
the subjection of EU operators to the same system as that applied to third-country undertakings; 
the presumption of circumvention of national rules by any cross-border service; or a particular 
zeal in regularly checking suppliers from other Member States. See European Commission 
report, cited supra note 1, 53–54. A case in point is gambling services. The ECJ adopted a reluc-
tant stance notably when it comes to games of chance offered via the internet. The ECJ rejected 
the relevance of the principle of mutual recognition in this type of situation on the basis that the 
mere fact that a supplier lawfully provides services of this type in another MS “cannot be 
regarded as amounting to a sufficient assurance that national consumers will be protected against 
the risks of fraud and crime, in the light of the difficulties liable to be encountered in such a con-
text by the authorities of the [host MS] in assessing the professional qualities and integrity of 
operators”. See Case C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International, 
judgment of 8 Sept. 2009, nyr, para 69; and C-203/08, Sporting Exchange, judgment of 3 June 
2010, nyr, para 33.
17. Note, however, that some of the most sensitive services sectors are outside the scope of 
the Directive. See Art. 2:2 of the Directive.
18. The Directive provides that suppliers already established in another Member State can-
not be prevented from providing their services in a given Member State on the basis that they do 
not have an establishment in that Member State (Art. 16(2)(a)). For the sake of comparison, 
Art. 56 on the freedom to provide services is the equivalent of Mode 1, Mode 2 and Mode 4 
under the GATS, since it covers the supply of services on a cross-border basis, the movement of 
the consumer to the location of the supplier to receive the service and the temporary movement 
of the supplier in order for him to be able to supply the service in question in the host country.
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of Justice case law on related issues.19 While numerous sectors are excluded 
from the scope of the Directive, the latter does apply to business services and 
covers inter alia, most of the regulated professions within the EU. Importantly, 
ratione materiae, the Directive adopts a sweeping definition of the term 
“requirements”, so as to cover 
“any obligation, prohibition, condition or limit provided for in the laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States or in 
 consequence of case law, administrative practice, the rules of professional 
bodies, or the collective rules of professional associations or other profes-
sional organizations, adopted in the exercise of their legal autonomy”.20 
This  definition thereby confirms the view that private action by professional 
associations when they self-regulate their activities is equally subject to the 
obligations laid down in the Directive.
 According to estimations, this new framework, when transposed to national 
laws, is expected to have tangible beneficial effects for EU growth and employ-
ment rates.21 It follows that, even in the absence of the country of origin prin-
ciple, the effect of the Directive should not be underestimated. It should rather 
be deemed a major step towards further developing mutual trust with a view 
to expanding trade in services within the EU. Fighting the ignorance relating 
to the scope of EU law at the national level and the lack of transparency regard-
ing national measures affecting the delivery of services, as well as leveling the 
playing field with regard to the protection of public interest to a certain extent, 
is an appropriate way forward to further enhance trust among Member States. 
Mutual confidence cannot come out of the blue and “invisible hands” are 
simply a chimera when it comes to the cognitive part of trust, as exemplified 
by the unfortunate narrative of the “Polish plumber”. Arguably, this mistrust 
among the Member State authorities, sometimes accompanied by phobic 
domestic political discourse or media campaigns launched by domestic con-
stituents and special interest groups is translated into a lack of confidence from 
the side of citizens towards foreign services.
2.2. The legal mandate relating to CoC enshrined in the Directive
The Directive incorporates a convergence programme aiming to, inter alia, 
target harmonization in specific areas, such as the access to the activity of 
19. See, inter alia, Case C-55/94, Gebhard, [1995] ECR I-4165, paras. 22–27. 
20. Art. 4(7) of the Directive. See also European Commission (DG Internal Market and 
 Services), “Handbook on Implementation of the Services Directive”, 2007, 16.
21. WTO, “Trade Policy Review – European Communities”, WT/TPR/S/177, 22 Jan. 2007, 
109.
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judicial recovery of debts or private security services and transport of cash and 
valuables. An important part of this chapter forms the mandate directed to the 
Member States and the Commission to encourage the establishment of pan-
European CoC. Article 37 of the Directive reads: “Member States shall, in 
cooperation with the Commission, take accompanying measures to encourage 
the drawing up at Community [sic] level, particularly by professional bodies, 
organizations and associations, of codes of conduct aimed at facilitating the 
provision of services or the establishment of a provider in another Member 
State, in conformity with Community [sic] law.”
 In the absence of a top-down approach that the country of origin principle 
would substantiate, the Directive puts the accent on the merits of a bottom-up 
approach, where the private sector is called upon to fulfil a decisive role and 
serve the objective of furthering European integration. The call for the creation 
of CoC is clearly an element in moving in this direction. While technically 
forming part of Chapter VII of the Directive, the mandate incorporated in 
Article 37 regarding the creation of pan-European CoC is deemed an essential 
component of the Directive’s most important objectives, as depicted notably 
in Chapter V of the Directive, to improve the quality of the services supplied 
within the Union and to enhance transparency as to the conditions regulating 
the access to and the exercise of a given profession in the various Member 
States.22 Supplying services of high quality is rightly considered as an essential 
prerequisite for the improvement of European competitiveness and the estab-
lishment of the Union as the best exporter of services worldwide. 
 CoC appear to be particularly relevant for the so-called “regulated profes-
sions” within the EU legal order where compulsory registration with the cor-
responding professional associations also exists.23 A regulated profession is 
“a professional activity or group of professional activities, access to which, 
the pursuit of which, or one of the modes of pursuit of which is subject, 
directly or indirectly, by virtue of legislative, regulatory or administrative 
provisions to the possession of specific professional qualifications; in par-
ticular, the use of a professional title limited by legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provisions to holders of a given professional qualification 
shall constitute a mode of pursuit”.24 
Regulated professions have two important traits: first, registration with the 
professional association is compulsory. Second, these professions are self-
regulated for the most part. Compulsory registration allows for sanctions 
22. See European Commission Handbook, cited supra note 20, 62.
23. The use of CoC seems also to be appealing to other areas of services such as information 
society services.
24. Art. 3(1)(a) of the Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 7 Sept. 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, O.J. 2005, L 255/22.
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against those professionals who do not abide by the rules established by the 
professional body, including deontological rules usually contained in the 
 sectoral CoC. However, not all professions oblige the individuals concerned 
to register with the professional association. The mandate of Article 37 is 
equally – if not more – important for non-regulated professions, as the unifor-
mity of rules of ethics that apply to them across the Union can be even looser. 
A common set of rules for these professions will enhance quality and gain the 
trust of consumers, while allowing for the identification of those who may be 
“cheating”. 
2.3. Why create pan-European Codes of Conduct?
Because of the manifest abundance of non-governmental collective rules in 
this area, including CoC, Member States and the Commission recognize the 
beneficial effects of drawing up common sets of rules pertaining to issues such 
as independence, impartiality or professional secrecy, which would apply to a 
given profession exercised across the Union. As professional associations 
become the final “masters” of the pursuit of the corresponding profession at 
national level, setting both pre- and post-access-related rules, typically through 
a government act that delegates its regulatory powers to the associations, one 
can realize the positive effects that some alignment of the ethical or other rules 
regulating the profession may have for the integration of the EU services 
 market. In addition, the risk of abuse may be particularly high in cases where 
domestic suppliers, in their function as members of the domestic professional 
association, may be called upon to decide on the aptitude of a service supplier 
originating in another Member State and intending to establish herself in that 
market or applying for an authorization to deliver her services cross-border.25 
 This mandate highlights the fact that existing rules of conduct at a national 
level, while not discriminating on the basis of origin of the service supplier, 
can potentially constitute unnecessary barriers to the freedom to provide ser-
vices and the freedom of establishment. This is so because they bring about 
regulatory asymmetries and market fragmentation, or otherwise impede the 
mobility of service suppliers or their ability to supply their services in a cross-
border manner. As professionals increasingly supply their services across bor-
ders, the need for common sets of minimum rules of conduct which would 
determine the contours of the supply of a given service throughout the Union 
is becoming pressing if a genuine internal market for services is to be achieved. 
25. See e.g. Case C-506/04, Wilson, [2006] ECR I-8613, paras. 50–58. Of course, States may 
intervene to provide for certain guarantees ensuring objectivity and impartiality of such deci-
sions. Cf. Case C-250/03, Mauri, [2005] ECR I-1267, paras. 44–45, 32–35.
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Ultimately, such sets of rules will ensure uniformity regarding the minimum 
level of consumer protection and the high quality of the services supplied at 
EU level.26 
 Adequately pursuing public policy objectives at EU level is essential in the 
quest to further enhance trust between Member States. Indeed, the current 
status quo with diverse CoC agreed on exclusively at a national level hints at 
a national perception of the quality of services. In addition, the fact that some 
professional associations in a given Member State are not subject to a domes-
tic CoC may create prejudice in other Member States with regard to the qual-
ity of the services supplied by the members of these professional associations, 
and ultimately lead to a certain distrust (in particular, when the services are 
supplied cross-border) and to market fragmentation.27 Therefore , the function 
of the CoC is twofold: they facilitate mobility of service suppliers (mobility-
enabling function), but at the same time they aim to enhance trust in services 
and service suppliers originating in other Member States (confidence-building 
function). Importantly, CoC will lead to the identification of a minimum, 
acceptable level of quality when a given service is supplied and, more impor-
tantly, to the emergence of a European concept of “quality of service” in given 
services sectors, which would be an identifiable trait of these sectors through-
out and beyond the Union.
 Furthermore, the creation of pan-European CoC would simplify the current 
conundrum with several national CoC applying to situations which go beyond 
national borders. For instance, take the case of the Lawyers Establishment 
Directive,28 which establishes a mechanism for the mutual recognition of 
 professional titles of migrant lawyers desiring to practise under their home-
country professional title. This Directive provides that a European lawyer must 
comply not only with the rules of professional conduct applicable in her home 
Member State but also with those of the host Member State, failing which she 
will incur disciplinary sanctions and exposure to professional liability.29 
 Nevertheless, quid when these rules are conflicting? Or with services where 
it cannot be determined in which Member State they are actually supplied?30 
26. European Commission Handbook, cited supra note 20, 68.
27. See European Commission (DG Internal Market and Services), “Enhancing the Quality 
of Services in the Internal Market: The Role of European Codes of Conduct”, 2007, 6.
28. Directive 98/5 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 Feb. 1998 to facilitate 
practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in 
which the qualification was obtained, O.J. 1998, L 77/36.
29. Ibid., Arts. 6 and 7.
30. For the sake of comparison, similar questions have been raised as to the distinction 
between Mode 1 (cross-border supply) and Mode 2 (consumption abroad) under the GATS. See 
e.g. WTO, Trade in Services: “Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services”, S/L/92, 28 March 2001, 22. 
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Situations of this type call for coherent solutions. Finally, the nature of other 
rules such as limitations on the types of services that can be supplied or on the 
legal form under which such services are allowed to be supplied may have a 
dissuasive effect on professionals of other Member States otherwise capable 
of exercising the fundamental freedoms enshrined in Articles 49 and 56 TFEU.
2.4. What content for the pan-European Codes of Conduct?
The Directive does not contain any specific guidance with respect to the form 
of such CoC nor to their content. For instance, it does not attempt to hint at 
what “ensuring the quality” entails or what should be the level of protection 
pursued.31 Rather, it bluntly spells out the telos of the mandate, that is, the 
facilitation of free movement pursuant to the Treaties.32 Neverthel ess, absent 
any further specifications under Article 37, the recitals preceding the main 
body of the Directive are highly informative. Thus, they first make clear that 
pan-European CoC should aim to ensure the quality of the service supplied 
and at the same time take into consideration the specificities of the profession 
at issue. In Article 26(3), the link is made between quality assurance, consumer 
protection and co-operation between professional bodies and consumer asso-
ciations at EU level. This provision requires that Member States, together with 
the Commission, enact appropriate measures to instigate co-operation of pri-
vate associations at the EU level to promote the quality of services, notably 
by facilitating the proper assessment of the competence of a given provider. 
Reducing the existing information asymmetries would lead to enhanced con-
sumer protection and enable informed choices by consumers. Furthermore, the 
compatibility of CoC with legally binding rules relating to professional ethics 
and conduct at a national level and competition law at EU level should be 
ensured.33
31. The Court appears to be ready to consider as acceptable at EU level the level of protec-
tion proposed by the Commission, having regard to the public interest pursued by the various 
Member States. See Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, [1997] ECR I-2405, 
paras. 16 and 17; also Case C-168/98, Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council, [2000] ECR 
I-9131, paras. 43–44.
32. In this sense, CoC have a post-law function, in that they supplement and support the 
practical application of secondary law, in casu, the Directive. At the same time, it can be argued 
that they are intended as an alternative to EU legislation and therefore they can also be deemed 
to have a para-law function. See Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart, 2004), 
pp. 214–215.
33. See recital 113 of the Directive on the applicability of the EU competition rules to CoC, 
see Section 5 infra.
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 In more general terms, CoC typically codify traditional virtues that have 
demarcated a given profession for decades or even centuries34 and spe ll out 
binding obligations adopted by governments, usually going beyond what law 
prescribes.35 They comprise rules relating to independence, impartiality, loy-
alty, professional competence and integrity, trustworthiness, confidentiality, 
conflict of interest, charging of fees and professional secrecy. CoC typically 
include rules about desirable behaviour (value orientation) and rules about 
prohibited behaviour (compliance orientation).36 Such rules are typically 
related to professional conduct, but they may also call for a certain lifestyle in 
private life.37 Furthermore, depending on the specifics of the profession, they 
define the conflicting interests and ideally hierarchize them. For instance, 
Article 2.7 of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) Code 
of Professional Conduct stipulates that the primary allegiance of a lawyer 
should be to her client,  sacrificing her own interest and that of her colleagues.38
 In several professional services, such as legal, CoC may require that profes-
sionals be covered by professional liability insurance39 for errors and omissions 
the level of which will depend on the nature and extent of the risk.40 As com-
pliance with this latter rule is typically reflected in the final price of the service 
delivered, agreement on common rules appears to be essential to avoid unfair 
price-based competition. For instance, competition can be distorted when 
domestic professionals are obliged to conclude such insurance, whereas cross-
border suppliers or suppliers temporarily providing their services may not be 
bound by such a rule in their home State. The cross-border suppliers would 
34. The Code of Professional Conduct, adopted by the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe (CCBE) in 1988 and most recently amended in 2006, underscores in its Art. 2(2) that 
trust and professional integrity are traditional virtues that constitute at the same time  professional 
obligations. This Code is binding on any lawyer undertaking cross-border activities within 
Europe.
35. For the purpose of this study, the concept of CoC should be considered as also encom-
passing elements that, in practice, may be found in quality charters. The latter comprise exclu-
sively rules describing the manner in which the service is to be provided.
36. See Nijhof, Cludts, Fisscher and Laan, “Measuring the implementation of Codes of 
 Conduct – An assessment method based on a process approach of the responsbile organisation”, 
45 Journal of Business Ethics (2003), 66.
37. E.g. Art. 2 of the International Code of Ethics adopted by the International Bar Associa-
tion (IBA) in 1956 and amended in 1988 provides that: “Lawyers shall at all times maintain the 
honour and dignity of their profession. They shall, in practice as well as in private life, abstain 
from any behaviour which may tend to discredit the profession of which they are members.”
38. Supra note 34.
39. Pursuant to Art. 23(5) of the Directive, professional liability insurance is a type of insur-
ance taken out by a provider to cover potential liabilities to recipients and, where applicable, 
third parties arising out of the provision of the service.
40. The Directive hints at this possibility and the need for the conclusion of professional 
insurance cover. See recitals 98, 99 and Art. 23 of the Directive.
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not have to internalize any insurance cost in the final cost of their service and 
thus can offer it at a lower price. 
 Finally, CoC often include provisions on disciplinary sanctions in case the 
rules are not abided by, although usually this deterrent is only used in abstracto 
and mentioned as a mere possibility.41 However, civil or even penal sanctions 
cannot be excluded in the case of serious infringement.42
 In addition to these basic, mostly fiduciary standards, of particular impor-
tance for our purposes are two areas where the Directive contains fairly detailed 
rules on the legality of restrictions: the first relates to commercial communica-
tions while the second refers to the establishment of multidisciplinary practices.
 Rules governing commercial communications typically form part of CoC 
in several services sectors.43 In the Commission’s report on “the State of the 
Internal Market for Services”, the distortive effect of restrictive and detailed 
rules for such communications – ranging from outright prohibitions on adver-
tising to strict control of content – was highlighted. Such restrictions are par-
ticularly burdensome for professionals or legal persons who are not established 
in a given jurisdiction and thus their only option to become known in that 
market is through this type of promotional activities. Contrary to the case of 
goods, such rules impede the pursuance of a pan-European promotional cam-
paign. The report identified the existence of such limitations in several sectors, 
such as business (where most of the regulated professions are classified), dis-
tribution, telecommunication, or financial services.44 
 Article 24 of the Directive invites Member States (but also professional 
bodies and private associations regulating the pursuit of a given profession in 
a collective manner) to remove all outright bans on commercial communica-
tions by the regulated professions, such as bans of all advertising in one or 
more media of communication.45 Manifestly, the Directive does not seek to 
question the utility of prohibitions on the content, but only those restrictions 
41. See Art. 1(2)(1) of the CCBE Code of Professional Conduct, cited supra note 34.
42. See European Commission report cited supra note 27, 9.
43. Commercial communication includes any form of communication designed to promote, 
directly or indirectly, the goods, services or image of an undertaking, organization or person 
engaged in commercial, industrial or craft activity or practising a regulated profession. See 
Art. 4(12) of the Directive. According to the Handbook, not only advertising but also other 
means of communication such as business cards mentioning the title and the specialty of the 
service supplier should be regarded as coming under this definition. See European Commission 
Handboook, cited supra note 20, 65. This, however, is too broad an interpretation. A business 
card, unlike a prospectus or a brochure, would merely give factual information relating to the 
titles of the supplier or his contact details such as professional address and phone number. 
 Therefore, it is argued that business cards would probably fit into the exception of Art. 4(12)(a) 
of the Directive. 
44. European Commission report, cited supra note 1, 27–29.
45. See also recital 100 of the Directive.
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relating to the chosen form of commercial communication.46 The link 
with codes of conduct is made in paragraph 2 of Article 24 which requires 
Member States to ensure that communications of this type are consistent with 
professional rules which are in conformity with EU law. These rules, usually 
enshrined in voluntary CoC, set rules, conditions and qualifications with 
respect to the independence, dignity and integrity of the profession or the 
appropriate conduct relating to professional secrecy. The Directive requires 
that such rules be non-discriminatory, justified by an overriding public interest 
requirement and compatible with the principle of proportionality. In addition, 
they have to be specific to the nature of the profession at issue. This specific-
ity requirement calls for a case-by-case analysis of rules limiting commercial 
communications.47 The Directive acknowledges the need for a bottom-up 
approach whereby the professionals themselves should agree on pan-European 
rules governing the suitability of the content and methods of commercial com-
munications in their own profession, which will form an integral part of the 
pan-European CoC for this profession.48 
 Another element that was identified in the Commission’s report on the “State 
of the Internal Market for Services” and picked up in the Directive is the con-
sistency with EU law of restrictions or limitations relating to multidisciplinary 
practices. Article 25 of the Directive seeks the removal of requirements limit-
ing the exercise of different activities jointly or in partnership where such 
restrictions are not necessary to ensure the impartiality, independence and 
integrity of the regulated professions or to guarantee compliance with the rules 
governing professional ethics and conduct.49 The Directive further specifies 
that several restrictions on such partnerships can be tolerated, such as certifi-
cation, accreditation, technical monitoring and testing services, insofar as a 
close link with the objective of ensuring the independence and impartiality of 
the providers in question is established.50 However, in the case where Member 
States decide to allow the creation of multidisciplinary partnerships, the Direc-
tive requires that Member States guarantee the prevention of conflicts of inter-
est and the independence and impartiality of the providers. Importantly, the 
Directive alludes to the findings of the Wouters case by reiterating the impor-
tance of adopting rules of professional ethics and conduct, typically incorpo-
46. In practice, the distinction between the two may not be made so straightforwardly.
47. E.g. the ECJ found that such a ban on advertising in the dental surgery sector in Belgium 
was consistent with the EU competition rules. Case C-446/05, Doulamis, [2008] ECR I-1377.
48. Ibid.
49. See recital 101 of the Directive. 
50. According to Arts. 25(3) and 39 of the Directive setting a framework for mutual evalua-
tion of laws and regulations in the area of services, Member States shall evaluate existing restric-
tions and explain why they consider them to be justified, including why less restrictive means are 
not available in this respect. See European Commission Handbook, cited supra note 20, 66.
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rated in professional CoC, which are compatible with the activities represented 
in these partnerships, especially when professional secrecy may be put in 
 jeopardy.51 In addition, and again based on the Court’s findings in Wouters and 
the Directive, a separate examination of the specific nature of the relevant 
professions is warranted to uphold or deny the legality of restrictions against 
multidisciplinary practices.52
 The Directive calls for the review and assessment of the relevant legislation, 
inter alia, relating to multidisciplinary activities based on the conditions set 
out by the Directive. As noted earlier, this screening process must cover all 
relevant rules of professional bodies or collective rules of professional asso-
ciations or any professional organizations which are adopted in the exercise 
of their right to self-regulate their profession. Requirements to be reviewed 
equally include rules adopted at all levels of government. Ideally, this process 
should lead to strong harmonization forces to ensure equivalent protection 
across the Union and a certain level of mutual trust to eliminate obstacles to 
the freedom to provide services.53
 Harmonization with regard to rules of multidisciplinary partnerships will 
also decrease the compliance costs for those service suppliers which have 
already adopted this business model in one Member State, but who – due to 
restrictions in other Member States – cannot exercise their fundamental free-
doms guaranteed by the Treaty.54 In fact, nowadays the clientele is increasingly 
sophisticated and thus the delivery of a complete range of services, such as 
legal, accounting and tax advice within the same house, renders the latter fairly 
attractive.55 Moreover, restrictions on such partnerships may be more justifiable 
in certain services than in others. Putting Wouters aside, it seems that there are 
feeble arguments justifying restrictions in partnerships between architects and 
engineers where the independence of professionals may not be as important 
as in other services, such as legal services or accounting, the homogeneity of 
which is contentious at best. From this perspective, minimum harmonization 
and the adoption of objective conditions across the Union appears to be com-
51. In Wouters, the Court emphasized that restrictions relating to the creation of multi-
disciplinary practices can be justified if the activities in question are not bound by comparable 
requirements of professional conduct, in casu of professional secrecy. See Case C-309/99, 
 Wouters, [2002] ECR I-1577, para 104.
52. Ibid., paras. 101–103. For the most important types of restrictions under this category, 
see European Commission report, cited supra note 1, 19.
53. See European Commission Proposal, cited supra note 9, 4.
54. See European Commission, “Extended Impact Assessment of Proposal for a Directive on 
Services in the Internal Market”, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2004)21, 13 Jan. 2004, 
20.
55. What the ECJ called “one-stop-shop advantage” in Wouters, cited supra note 51, para 87; 
also WTO, Council for Trade in Services, “Legal Services”, Background Note by the Secretariat, 
S/C/W/43, 6 July 1998, 14.
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pelling, as it enables economies of scale and allows the productivity of service 
suppliers to be enhanced through this type of synergy.
 It follows that, although the Directive adopts a rather liberal approach 
vis-à-vis the content of CoC, allowing considerable room for manoeuvre to 
professional bodies to self-regulate their industry and establish deontological 
rules in co-ordination with their counterparts in other Member States, it adopts 
a more interfering stance towards the need for common rules relating to com-
mercial communications and multidisciplinary practices. The semantics are 
obvious: the chances that these categories of rules hinder the establishment of 
a genuine internal market and distort competition are high and therefore par-
ticular attention and action at EU level is warranted.
2.5. Additional functions of Codes of Conduct
CoC can be used by courts as supplementary evidence or means of interpreta-
tion to corroborate a specific finding. For instance, in Commission v. 
Luxembourg and in Wilson, the Court referred to the CCBE Code of Conduct56 
to corroborate its argument that sufficient guarantees exist in the legal profes-
sion to minimize the risk of not imposing a prior test of knowledge of the 
national language, and thus consumer interests were adequately protected.57 
The judicial reference to CoC, notably when the proportionality of a given 
legislation is examined, can be another reason for professional associations to 
use them as a marketing tool,58 i.e. to  accentuate the importance and unique-
ness of their profession for the entire society, which may justify a different 
treatment from State public regulatory authorities and courts at the national 
or, in casu, supranational level.59
 Thus, CoC serve an imperative function for a given services (sub-)sector: 
enunciating its professional norms and reassuring external parties (consumers, 
colleagues, the government and society as a whole) of the integrity, competence 
and the high standards enforced and maintained in the sector.60 Rules in corpo-
rated in CoC aim to codify obligations that professionals have to abide by to 
deserve the trust of their clients and of society overall. By adhering to such 
standards, professionals become trustworthy. The CCBE Code of Conduct is 
56. Supra note 34.
57. See Case C-193/05, Commission v. Luxembourg, [2006] ECR I-8673, para 44; Wilson, 
cited supra note 25, para 74. In the WTO context, see Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, 
para 7.16.
58. See European Commission, “Instruments for a modernized single market policy”, SEC 
(2007)1518, 20 Nov. 2007, 12.
59. Cf. Art. 1.1 of the CCBE Code of Professional Conduct, cited supra note 34.
60. See Higgs-Kleyn and Kapelianis, “The Role of Professional Codes in Regulating Ethical 
Conduct”, 19 Journal of Business Ethics (1999), 364.
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again revealing in this respect when it emphasizes the role of legal professional 
privilege, noting that “[c]onfidentiality is … a primary and fundamental right 
and duty of the lawyer” and that “[w]ithout the certainty of confidentiality 
there cannot be trust”.61 Indeed, confidentiality and professional secrecy protect 
the client from indiscreet disclosures which may harm her integrity and repu-
tation.62 Interestingly, the C ode goes on to suggest that the respect of this 
principle not only serves the interest of the client, but also that of the admin-
istration of justice and therefore deserves to be protected by the State.63 In AM 
& S,64 the ECJ also concurred with this view and upheld the principle of con-
fidentiality of written communications between lawyers and clients.65 More 
generally, confidentiality and professional secrecy is “an obligation of discre-
tion forming part of the ethics of a profession”.66
 Viewed from this angle, CoC also describe the conduct which the recipients 
of services are entitled to receive from the professionals abiding by the CoC 
and thus create expectations as to the quality standard for a given service. The 
role of the governing professional body is crucial on this score due to its 
autonomous, self-regulatory power and the control that it exerts over its mem-
bers. Professional bodies are there to ensure that professional traditions are 
adhered to. In Cipolla, the Commission implicitly referred to rules included 
in CoC for the legal profession in a favourable manner. More specifically, it 
contended that 
“quasi-legislative rules, such as, inter alia, rules on access to the legal 
profession, disciplinary rules serving to ensure compliance with profes-
sional ethics and rules on civil liability have, by maintaining a high quali-
tative standard for the services provided by such professionals which those 
measures guarantee, a direct relationship of cause and effect with the pro-
tection of lawyers’ clients and the proper working of the administration of 
justice”.67
61. See Art. 2(3)(1) of the CCBE Code of Professional Conduct, cited supra note 34.
62. See Opinion of A.G. Maduro in Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones and 
germanophones and others, [2007] ECR I-5305, point 41.
63. The ECtHR found that the right to a fair trial can also be violated in the case of disrespect 
of professional secrecy of lawyers. See ECtHR judgment on Niemitz v. Germany of 16 Dec. 
1992, para 37. See also ECtHR judgment on Foxley v. United Kingdom of 20 June 2000, 
para 50.
64. See Case 155/79, AM & S, [1982] ECR 1575.
65. See also Joined Cases 125 & 253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v. 
Commission, [2007] ECR II-3523, para 120.
66. See Opinion of A.G. Maduro in Ordre des barreaux francophones and germanophones 
and others, cited supra note 62, point 37.
67. Joined Cases C-94/04 & C-202/04, Cipolla, [2006] ECR I-11421, para 63.
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2.6. Material izing the mandate and enforcing the CoC – a peculiar public- 
 private partnership
In all other respects, professional associations are called upon to set up pan-
European CoC for their own discipline taking into account the peculiarities 
of their profession and ensuring that rules guaranteeing independence, 
 impartiality, integrity and professional secrecy are agreed upon.68 While, as 
noted earlier, the Directive remains silent as to the appropriate method for 
drawing up a CoC, the Commission draws attention to the significance of 
conforming to principles of good governance during that process.69 The 
 procedures should be open, publicly accessible, fair, non-discriminatory and 
objective. They should be communicated in advance to all stakeholders 
involved (including consumers) to ensure transparency, inclusiveness and 
representativeness.
 Representativeness may be a key issue in drawing up pan-European CoC.70 
There are professions whose representation is clearly structured, so that ensur-
ing representativeness for these professions at a European level may not be 
problematic. However, in other professions, ensuring representativeness in the 
creation of pan-European CoC may be thorny. First, there are activities, such 
as several non-regulated professions, which often do not have a representative 
professional organization at all. Second, disparities among Member States may 
exist to the effect that in some Member States no relevant professional asso-
ciation exists. Third, and quite inversely, in other service activities more than 
one professional association may be claiming eligibility for participation in 
drawing up pan-European CoC. In the latter case, while pluralism can in cer-
tain cases be beneficial, some co-ordination or even consolidation may be 
warranted to achieve optimal and expeditious results.
 Along with ensuring representativeness, implementing the newly adopted 
pan-European CoC will also be a challenge for the principal actors in this 
effort. Clearly, it is for the Member State to take all the necessary measures to 
encourage professionals to implement these CoC at the national level. Of 
course, Member States are allowed to take more stringent measures if they 
consider that the level of protection adopted at EU level is not commensurate 
with domestic preferences and peculiarities. By the same token, domestic pro-
fessional bodies can seek higher levels of protection in their existing or future 
national CoC.71 Viewed from this angle, pan-European and national CoC can 
co-exist and complement each other. Nevertheless, in order not to deprive the 
68. See recital 114 of the Directive.
69. European Commission report, cited supra note 27, 10.
70. Ibid., at 8. 
71. See recital 115 of the Directive.
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Directive and the mandate relating to the creation of pan-European CoC of its 
effet utile, Member States and/or professional bodies should be able to explain 
the particular situations that justify the stringency of the rules or conditions at 
the national level. The Commission, assisted by the Article 40 Committee,72 
will be in charge of supervising the implementation of the Directive and 
 receiving notifications as to changes in laws, regulations, and requirements 
adopted by both public bodies and private bodies which, in the exercise of 
their legal autonomy, are allowed to adopt rules in a collective manner.
 The creation of CoC becomes a shared obligation of Member States and the 
Commission, which cannot be materialized without the active involvement of 
the private parties affected (or their associations) pursuant to Article 37. This 
tripartite approach aims to bring together the most important actors in the 
regulation of business services across the Union. Just as under Article 26, where 
Members are required to encourage action by private parties,73 Article 37 
requires that Member States, in co-operation with the Commission and 
 obviously with associations representing service suppliers such as professional 
bodies or chambers of commerce as well as consumer associations, take 
 practical steps so that service suppliers and professional associations create 
CoC at EU level to enable full use of the freedom to provide services and the 
 freedom of establishment. 
 It bears mention that this privileged role of the Commission is ordained not 
only by its function as Hüterin der Verträge according to Article 211 EC 
(repealed and replaced in substance by Art. 17(1) TEU by the Lisbon Treaty),74 
but also in the aftermath of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2003 on better 
law-making.75 In this Agreement, a central role was entrusted to the Commis-
sion when recourse is made to alternative methods of regulation. Indeed, para-
graph 17 of the Agreement provides that it is for the Commission to ensure 
that “any use of co-regulation or self-regulation is always consistent with 
Community [sic] law and that it meets the criteria of transparency (in particu-
lar the publicizing of agreements) and representativeness of the parties 
involved.” In this respect, the Commission conducted a public on-line consul-
tation in summer 2007 inviting professional organizations to submit informa-
tion on their current CoC in force or in preparation, if applicable, and to express 
their views as to the most adequate content of such codes within their respec-
72. Art. 40(1) of the Directive states “ The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee”.
73. E.g., under Art. 26(1)(b), Member States, backed by the Commission, have to encourage 
service providers and their associations to draw up their own quality charters or labels at EU 
level. In addition, under Art. 26(5) of the Directive, the development of voluntary (obviously 
industry-driven) compatibility standards at EU level should be actively encouraged.
74. Case C-531/06, Commission v. Italy, [2009] ECR I-4103.
75. European Parliament/Council/Commission, “Interinstitutional Agreement on Better 
Law-making”, O.J. 2003, C 321/1.
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tive disciplines. The involvement of the Commission is likely to become even 
more active when self-regulation substitutes for EU action in an area that comes 
under the competence of the EU, such as the creation and proper functioning 
of a genuine internal market for services. In addition, the Commission will 
report to the other EU legislating institutions on the successes or failures of 
this experimental regulatory power transfer. 
 A weakness of the Directive in its present form is that it does not set specific 
deadlines for the realization of the mandate. In the initial proposal submitted 
by the Commission, however, Article 40(2)(b) required that the Commission 
intervene to propose solutions in cases where “it has not been possible to final-
ize codes of conduct before the date of transposition [this would mean by the 
end of 2009] or for which such codes are insufficient to ensure the proper 
functioning of the Internal Market”. A more nuanced and flexible stance is 
adopted in the final text of the Directive whereby the role of the Commission 
is downgraded, whereas the optimistic plan of finalizing some pan-European 
CoC before 2010 is not reiterated. This absence of deadlines can be partly 
explained by the immense differences among services sectors that exist in 
reality with regard to co-ordinated efforts at EU level. Hence, choosing a less 
prescriptive approach was imposed by the reality. While 50 per cent of the 
European professional organizations have already drawn up a European CoC 
for their profession,76 others are not that advanced or successful in their efforts 
to create such CoC.77 In addition, one can infer that the Commission is not 
always satisfied with existing CoC, as several of them do not appear to have 
respected basic standards of transparency, participation, representativeness, 
integration or responsibility.78 This would manifestly mean that, insofar as CoC 
created at EU level are explicitly warranted and the role of CoC should there-
fore be viewed henceforth from a new perspective, existing CoC would need 
to be revisited to ensure that they comply with fundamental principles of good 
governance.
76. See e.g. the code of the Architects’ Council of Europe and the European Tax Federation.
77. See European Commission report, cited supra note 27, 10.
78. Ibid.
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3. (European) governance without (European) government: 
Alternative methods of regulation
3.1. Contemporary law-shaping processes in the EU: Institutional   
 foundations 
The creation of pan-European CoC forms part of the non-legislative imple-
menting measures that Member States are called upon to take when transposing 
the Directive. It also forms part of a broader paradigm shift in EU rule-making, 
dating back to the White Paper on European governance79 and the Commi ssion’s 
Action Plan on better law-making.80 Gradually, th e European Union has moved 
towards and encouraged the introduction of new forms of governance, also 
driven by the notorious principle of subsidiarity81 and the Interinstitutional 
Agreement of 2003 on better law-making.82 Previously, the White Paper on 
European Governance submitted by the Commission in 2001, initiating its 
“Better Regulation Initiative”, had also hinted at the way forward by recogniz-
ing that “legislation is often only part of a broader solution” and that non-
binding rules can be equally important for the attainment of a given objective.83 
Such statements were in line with the paradigm shift in domestic administra-
tive laws and practices across developed countries in Europe and North 
America towards less rigidity and more power-sharing with those parties which 
had been asked for so many years to abide by the law, without having been 
given a chance to participate or being asked for their views during its 
preparation.84 
 Abandoning the previous rigid top-down approach and in a clear shift away 
from hierarchical forms of governing,85 the Union has progressively adopted 
a new legislative culture according to which consultations (even with non-
business stakeholders)86 enhance the involvement of interested parties and 
improve the quality of the policy outcome,87 whereas alternative modes of 
79. European Commission, “European Governance – A White Paper”, COM(2001)428, 
25 July 2001.
80. See European Commission, “Action Plan ‘Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory 
Environment’”, COM(2002)278, 5 June 2002.
81. See also Lisbon European Council, Presidency conclusions, 23–24 March 2000, para 38.
82. European Parliament/Council/Commission, cited supra note 75.
83. Ibid., 20.
84. Cf. Scott and Trubek, “Mind the Gap: Law and new approaches to governance in the 
European Union”, 8 ELJ (2002), 8.
85. Craig and de Búrca, EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP, 2008), p. 146.
86. European Commission communication, cited supra note 58, 19–20.
87. European Commission, “Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – 
General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commis-
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regulation of both legislative and non-legislative nature enacted at the peri-
phery complement and sometimes replace legislative action at EU level to 
achieve the objectives more effectively.88 Such instruments can be those pro-
vided by the Treaties, such as recommendations, but also emerging ones, such 
as co-regulation, self-regulation, voluntary sectoral agreements and codes of 
conduct, open method of co-ordination, financial assistance, or information 
campaigns.89 The binary ob jective of diversifying the Union’s regulatory instru-
ments and simplifying and improving the regulatory environment is essentially 
driven by the concern to improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, transparency 
and legal certainty of regulation within the Union.90 The experimentation with 
these instruments, nevertheless, must ensure swift and flexible regulation with-
out affecting the EU competition rules or the unity of the internal market. 
Additionally, at the governance level, ensuring coherence and consistency 
regarding the use of soft-law tools and preserving the institutional balance 
among EU institutions is of paramount importance.91
 The Interinst itutional Agreement of 2003 provides further clarification as 
to the scope of the instrument of self-regulation and the framework within 
which it is expected to be utilized. The Agreement defines self-regulation as 
“the possibility for economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental 
organizations or associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves 
common guidelines at European level”. Contrary to co-regulation, self-regu-
lation does not involve a legislative act and is essentially voluntary.92 Self-
regulation leads to the creation of soft law, soft law being defined as “rules of 
conduct, that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed 
legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal 
effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical effects”.93
sion”, COM(2002)704, 11 Dec. 2002, 5. The Lisbon Treaty formalizes and generalizes the duty 
of the Commission to consult with civil society “to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent 
and transparent”. See Art. 11 TEU.
88. This is in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity which suggests that the EU has to 
legislate “only to the extent necessary”. See Protocol No. 2 TFEU on the application of the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity and proportionality.
89. See European Commission report, cited supra note 27, 7.
90. Walker and de Búrca, “Reconceiving law and new governance”, 13 CJEL (2007), 519.
91. See the Medina Ortega Report, “on institutional and legal implications of the use of “soft 
law” instruments”, available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2007-0259+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> (last visited 1 Sept. 2009).
92. European Commission communication, cited supra note 58, 11. In the literature, how-
ever, several scholars consider the creation of CoC by the industry as a form of co-regulation. 
See, inter alia, Bignami, “Three generations of participation rights before the European Com-
mission”, (2004) Law and Contemporary Problems, 74.
93. Senden, op. cit. supra note 32, p. 112.
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 Self-regulation exemplifies the privatization of soft law.94 It is more often 
than not a deliberate delegation of regulatory authority conceded by the State 
over a given activity to a body which is composed of representatives of that 
activity. As examples of self-regulation, the Agreement makes explicit refer-
ence to codes of practice and sectoral agreements.95 The Agreement goes on 
to make clear that the choice of such a voluntary, decentralized instrument 
does not imply any preferred solutions by the EU institutions nor does it pre-
clude any future action by them. For instance, the Agreement stipulates that 
recourse to a legislative act based on a proposal by the Commission may be 
warranted when the self-regulatory body fails to comply with the Treaties or 
when the competent legislative authority requests it. This is yet another piece 
of evidence that the Classic Community Method is hale and hearty. This rec-
ognition demonstrates that, at least potentially, regulations remain the ultimate 
powerful tool for fixing problematic situations across the Union. They consti-
tute an instrument that the EU institutions are not ready to abandon so light-
heartedly – and justifiably so. 
 As noted earlier, the Commission’s institutional role dictates that it closely 
supervises self-regulation practices to ensure compliance with the Treaty.96 
Notably, the Commission should ascertain the contribution of self-regulation 
practices to the achievement of the Treaty objectives, as well as their legiti-
macy. Whilst conventional legal theory would deny self-regulation a role equal 
to that of an independent source of law, the growing impact of private rule-
making is part of contemporary reality and inevitably raises the issue of its 
legitimacy. In this regard, the Commission is bound to examine the extent of 
representativeness of the parties concerned, the sectoral and geographical cover 
and the added value of the commitments at stake.97 Even so, concerns remain 
regarding this peculiar intersection which may be occurring between the Com-
mission and powerful professional associations, which can be neither transpar-
ent nor comprehensible to the EU citizens, thereby creating a grey area of de 
facto legislating without democratic legitimacy.98
 At first blush, such a bottom-up approach may not be apposite when regulat-
ing services.99 Contrary to the majority of goods, many services are considered 
94. See Peters and Pagotto, “Soft law as a New Mode of Governance: A Legal Perspective” 
(2006), 5, available at <www.eu-newgov.org/database/DELIV/D04D11_Soft_Law_as_a_NMG-
Legal_Perspective.pdf> (last visited 5 Sept. 2009).
95. Interinstitutional Agreement cited supra note 75, para 22.
96. Cf the EU self- and co-regulation database in the homepage of the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC), available at <eesc.europa.eu/self-and-coregulation/index.asp> 
(last visited June 2009). 
97. Interinstitutional Agreement cited supra note 75, para 23.
98. Cf. Medina Ortega Report, cited supra note 91, 6.
99. Delimatsis, op. cit. supra note 7, p. 87.
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as being “experience goods” or even “credence (or ‘trust’) goods”,100 as their 
quality cannot be evaluated until they are consumed, or even years after the 
purchase took place, due to asymmetries of information between the service 
supplier (agent) and the consumer (principal). This information asymmetry 
may lead to adverse selection and a decline in quality as a result of competition 
based exclusively on price.101 Several professional services (e.g. legal, account-
ing, and notaries) also have the public good characteristics of non-rivalry and 
non-exclusivity. They are important not only for the smooth supply of other 
services but also for society and the unproblematic functioning of the economy 
overall.
 Therefore, when the market itself does not sufficiently protect the relevant 
values, political decision-making proceeds to an evaluation of the situation in 
the market and, ultimately, it overrides it.102 More specifically, the governmen-
tal intervention will prescribe the type of information that needs to be provided 
and will aid potential buyers to evaluate the information being supplied. 
Licensing, certification procedures, minimum harmonization, or liability laws 
are the usual governmental instruments to ensure competence, performance, 
technical behaviour and accountability.103 The primary a dvantage of legislation, 
then, is that, due to its inherently coercive qualities, it can improve resource 
allocation or aid in obtaining other benefits in cases where markets are inca-
pable of achieving these objectives on their own. Practice, however, shows 
that governmental failures have led to a disappointing picture of the services 
supply landscape within the Union, with several instances evidencing ineffec-
tive and undecided steps towards integration.
3.2 Self-regulation, professional services and (limited) harmonization
To be sure, self-regulation may be the ultimate form of regulatory capture and 
delegating regulatory power to professional bodies can constitute legitimiza-
tion of a cartel with wide ability to determine or influence the regulatory 
100. See Nelson, “Information and consumer behavior”, 78 Journal of Political Economy 
(1970), 311; also Akerlof, “The market for ‘lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mecha-
nism”, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics (1970), 488; also Darby and Karni, “Free Competi-
tion and the Optimal Amount of Fraud”, 16 Journal of Law and Economics (1973), 67. Darby 
and Karni actually demonstrate that in the case of goods that have credence qualities, govern-
mental intervention would not lead to an efficient allocation of resources and thus it would be 
preferable to leave the market unregulated.
101. Cf. Akerlof, op. cit. supra note 100.
102. If the market remains unregulated, this would lead to a lowering of standards, as con-
sumers would not be able to distinguish between low-quality and high-quality services. See also 
Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (OUP, 1994), p. 216.
103. Also OECD, “Competition in Professional Services”, DAFFE/CLP(2000)2, 2000, 18.
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framework and access to the profession to the benefit of professionals/members 
of the “club” but to the detriment of consumers.104 Case law has pointed to 
this risk of having competitors deciding on the application of potential 
new comers.105 
 Nevertheless, the Directive clearly makes a decisive move away from com-
mand-and-control regulation, by adopting a mix of regulatory techniques. 
These techniques rang from targeted harmonization where divergences are too 
wide to be maintained, to alternative methods of regulation where the Union 
recognizes the reality of self-regulation in many business services. This is the 
case in the field of professional CoC where the Directive calls upon individu-
als concerned and their associations to participate in rules-shaping and to 
decide on a common, pan-European set of rules on professional ethics and 
conduct of a non-coercive nature which would suit them best.106
 A public-interest theory approach would also suggest that conceding regu-
latory powers to the suppliers concerned would be the most cost-efficient 
solution due to the specialized knowledge of the professionals and their orga-
nized bodies, notably when it comes to distinguishing between high-quality 
and poor-quality services and service suppliers, but also because of the profes-
sionals’ ability to react more quickly and flexibly to new circumstances and 
adapt or revise their rules.107 In addition, this alternative method of regulation 
is likely to allow greater room for input, adaptation, and revision both on the 
part of those creating the rules and those subjected to the rules. Moreover, the 
choice of this type of instrument leads to wider ownership of the policies at 
stake, which appears essential when it comes to enforcement and compliance 
with rules of a non-binding nature. 
 CoC have been traditionally viewed with suspicion, as an attempt of the 
industries concerned to forestall State interference.108 However, we can no 
longer turn our back on reality: as Cutler puts it, “a growing asymmetry or 
104. Cf. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Harvard University Press, 1965).
105. See e.g. Case C-439/99, Commission v. Italy, [2002] ECR I-305, paras. 39–40. This 
case law is reflected in Art. 14(6) of the Directive. Under the WTO, in the case Argentina – Hides 
and Leather, the Panel found that, by allowing competitors having their own commercial inter-
ests to be implicated in the process of deciding on exportation and to have access to confidential 
business information, a State violated its obligation under Art. X:3(a) GATT to administer its 
measures in a reasonable and impartial manner. 
106. See European Commission Proposal, cited supra note 9, 9.
107. The Mandelkern Report used as ultimate criterion the satisfaction of the user and sug-
gested that public intervention may be warranted only when the user is not satisfied. See Man-
delkern Group on Better Regulation – Final Report, 2001, 14–15.
108. For this opinion, as it applies to the self-regulation of the legal profession, and why in 
this sector co-regulation may be preferable, see Zacharias, “The Myth of Self-Regulation”, 
93 Minnesota Law Review (2009), 1173.
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 disjuncture between the formal legal status of private participants and their 
actual, political significance is growing more acute, portending a crisis of 
legitimacy”.109 Nowadays, legitimizing influential rules set out in the exercise 
of private authority which may by now be de facto binding and complied with 
by the individuals/members of the professional associations, becomes pressing. 
Instead of trying to ignore their existence and prominent role in the everyday 
exercise of manifold professions and applying policies of exclusion, contem-
porary demands of participatory democracy would rather require an inclusive 
approach leading to the integration of these voices in rule-making and 
 rule-shaping.110 Whereas allowing professional bodies to regulate their own 
matters boils down to a question of social coherence, this upgrading of the role 
of private authority also calls for reforms and restructuring to ensure compli-
ance with current demands for internal and external transparency, due process, 
legitimacy, accountability, fairness and inclusiveness. Such reforms also seem 
to be warranted in the process of implementing the Directive at the national 
level. Indeed, the Directive includes several important transparency obligations 
referring to the conduct of the competent authorities. The definition of “com-
petent authority” is sufficiently comprehensive to include “professional bodies, 
and those professional associations or other professional organizations which, 
in the exercise of their legal autonomy, regulate in a collective manner access 
to service activities or the exercise thereof  ”.111
 Another, perhaps more practice-oriented justification inherent in the man-
date for the creation of pan-European CoC is the internationalization of the 
professions and the subsequent relativization of borders and jurisdictions.112 
The desire inherent in this mandate is that, where EU institutions and politics 
have largely failed, private rule-making may provide solutions that will come 
from the fated need of the business to expand across borders and the increas-
ing demands of customers for first-rate delivery of services regardless of geo-
graphical borders and competent fori.
 Regarding harmonization of professional standards, the EU gradually 
replaced its strategy of adopting harmonization legislation enshrined in verti-
cal directives during the 1970s and mid-1980s with horizontal directives, 
applying across services sectors.113 Those horizontal directives came in the 
109. See Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority – Transnational Merchant Law in the 
Global Political Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 195.
110. After all, participation is one of the five principles of good governance identified in the 
Commission’s White Paper on Governance.
111. See Art. 4(9) of the Directive.
112. Cf. with respect to legal services, Commission v. Luxembourg, cited supra note 57, 
para 45.
113. Directives 89/48, O.J. 1989, L 19/16; and 92/51, O.J. 1992, L 209/25.
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aftermath of important decisions delivered by the Court relating to the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition.114 However, the general system directives fell short 
of ensuring recognition; rather they obliged Member States to take into account 
qualifications and, if needed, impose additional requirements to achieve equiv-
alence with nationals holding national titles. The new directive on the recogni-
tion of professional qualifications, replacing all previous ones, is aimed 
to introduce a more flexible and automatic procedure which uses as a basis 
common platforms established by professional associations.115 As a result of 
Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, sig-
nificant reforms in all EU Member States regarding professional services were 
discussed with a view to fostering competition.116 By recognizing the profes-
sional qualifications of a given individual, the host Member State allows her 
to gain access in that Member State to the profession for which she is qualified 
in her home Member State and to pursue it under the same conditions as the 
nationals. The profession can be considered as being the same if the activities 
are “comparable”. 
 In cases falling outside the scope of the horizontal directive, the principles 
outlined by the ECJ in Gebhard, Heylens, Vlassopoulou, Aranitis and Bobadilla 
will still apply. This means that EU primary law continues to give guidance as 
to the proper modus operandi.117 Indeed, as underlined in Dreessen, the object 
of the horizontal directives on recognition of qualifications should not be “to 
make recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qual-
ifications more difficult in situations falling outside their scope, nor may they 
have such an effect”.118 More specifically, Article 49 TFEU requires that the 
national competent authorities take into consideration the knowledge, diplo-
mas, certificates, qualifications and experience already recognized or acquired 
in another Member State, give adequate reasons in case of non-recognition 
and allow for access to an effective judicial remedy. A similar type of com-
parison may also be warranted in the case of EU nationals who have acquired 
formal qualifications and practical experience in a third country.119 In practice, 
114. Most notably, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649; and Case 
C-340/89, Vlassopoulou, [1991] ECR I-2357. See on recent developments on the principle of 
mutual recognition Möstl, “Preconditions and limits of mutual recognition”, 47 CML Rev., 405–
436.
115. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms (OUP, 2007), p. 323.
116. Several of these proposed reforms have been discussed in the European Commission, 
“Progress by Member States in reviewing and eliminating restrictions to Competition in the area 
of Professional Services”, Commission Staff Working Document, COM(2005)405 final, 5 Sept. 
2005.
117. See, for instance, Commission v. Italy, cited supra note 74, paras. 35, 37.
118. Case C-31/00, Dreessen, [2002] ECR I-663, para 26.
119. See, inter alia, Case C-238/98, Hocsman, [2000] ECR I-6623, para 35.
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the Court will undertake a very broad interpretation of the fundamental freedom 
enshrined in Article 49 to outlaw any requirement which is liable to hinder or 
make less attractive the exercise of the right of establishment unless it is justi-
fied based on legitimate policy grounds and proportionate to the objective 
pursued.120
4. Applicability of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU to private action
In the universe of non-legislative, voluntary instruments adopted by private 
actors such as professional CoC, the question of the possibility for the private 
parties affected to have recourse to legal remedies becomes pressing. Just as 
other soft-law instruments, CoC can support a normative discourse similar to 
hard law. While violations of legal obligations are perhaps more striking, soft 
undertakings can stimulate “accountability politics” provided that they entail 
manifest normative commitments.121 Thus a strategy of “name and shame” can 
be very effective, notably in the area of professional services where individu-
alism and personal reputation are still significant. As the boundaries between 
State, legally binding action and private, essentially voluntary action are 
increasingly blurred and private authority sometimes emerges as a law-maker 
of similar effectiveness to public authority, the scope ratione materiae and the 
value of the fundamental freedoms is growing. It is commonplace now that 
the fragmentation of the internal market for services is also the inevitable result 
of the divergent standards adopted by non-public bodies in Member States, 
such as professional associations, sport federations, the social partners drawing 
up collective agreements, or interested parties or groups drawing up CoC or 
collective rules in the exercise of their legal autonomy. 
 Settled case law of the ECJ makes clear that circumventing the abolition of 
State barriers to market integration through obstacles stemming from rules (or 
the application thereof) set out by associations or organizations not governed 
by public law that are entrusted with broad legal autonomy and regulatory 
power cannot be allowed.122 Indeed, rules of any nature set out by private bod-
ies aimed at regulating gainful (self-) employment and the supply of services 
in a collective manner can impede the functioning of the internal market and 
120. See Case C-108/96, Mac-Quen, [2001] ECR I-837, paras. 24–26; and Case C-370/05, 
Festersen, [2007] ECR I-1129, para 26.
121. See Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and soft law in international governance”, 54 IO (2000), 
452.
122. Case 36/74, Walrave, [1974] ECR 1405, paras. 17, 23–24; Case 13/76, Donà, [1976] 
ECR 1333, paras. 17, 18; Case C-415/93, Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921, paras. 83–84; Case 
C-176/96, Lehtonen, [2000] ECR I-2681, para 35; Wouters, cited supra note 51, para 120.
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thus come within the purview of the fundamental freedom provisions of the 
Treaty.123
Recognizing t hat the activities of market participants can be restricted not 
only by action taken by Member States’ authorities but also by private action, 
the ECJ interpreted the fundamental freedoms in a broad manner with a view 
to enabling market participants to have adequate judicial protection and equal 
opportunities to gain access anywhere in the EU.124 Hence, the traditional 
approach that horizontal effect was only applicable with regard to the rules of 
competition, whereas the rules on free movement only had vertical effect was 
abandoned.125 In Walrave and Koch, for instance, the ECJ ruled that “the rule 
of non-discrimination applies in judging all legal relationships in so far as these 
relationships, by reason either of the place they are entered into or the place 
where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the Community 
[sic]”.126 Furthermore, the ECJ found that the provisions on the free movement 
of workers had not only vertical, but also horizontal effect in Clean Car127 and 
Angonese,128 noting that application of Article 39 EC (now 45 TFEU) only to 
public authority acts would disregard the fact that working conditions are 
typically governed both by public law and rules adopted by private persons. 
Thus, these rulings extended the Defrenne case law129 into the area of free 
movement of workers. 
The attempt of the ECJ to adopt a coherent approach towards the acceptance 
of the horizontal effect of the fundamental freedoms is more than obvious. In 
Schmidberger,130 the Court had found that private action should be subject to 
the provisions on the free movement of goods. In this case, it applied 
horizontally the fundamental freedom by balancing the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression of a group of individuals who were demonstrating, 
against the right of a transport company to exercise its rights deriving from 
the Treaty relating to the free movement of goods.131 Even if the action in 
Schmidberger was a case of State liability, the facts in the record suggest that 
the State was the third party in a situation where the constitutional rights of 
123. Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Commission, [2006] ECR I-6991, para 24.
124. See also Edward and Nic Shuibhne, “Continuity and change in the law relating to 
 services” in Arnull, Eeckhout, and Tridimas (Eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law – Essays 
in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (OUP, 2008), p. 243.
125. See e.g. Case 41/74, Van Duyn, [1974] ECR 1337, paras. 4–8.
126. Walrave, cited supra note 122, para 28.
127. Case C-350/96, Clean Car, [1998] ECR I-2521, paras. 19–21.
128. Case C-281/98, Angonese, [2000] ECR I-4139, paras. 33–34, 36.
129. Case 43/75, Defrenne, [1976] ECR 455, paras. 31 and 39.
130. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, [2003] ECR I-5659, paras. 57 and 62.
131. See also Case C-265/95, Commission v. France, [1997] ECR I-6959, para 30.
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one private party were jeopardized by the actions of another private party.132 In 
Viking Line,133 the ECJ had to decide, inter alia, on the horizontal effect of 
Article 43 EC (now 49 TFEU) on the freedom of establishment, i.e. whether 
a private undertaking can derive rights from this provision on which it can rely 
against a trade union or an association of trade unions. As expected, the ECJ 
had no difficulty in confirming the application of its settled case law relating 
to horizontal effect also in the case of Article 49 TFEU mutatis mutandis.134 
The ECJ suggested that the collective action taken by the trade unions and the 
association thereof is liable to restrict the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment by another private party and thus violates Article 49 TFEU.135 In 
previous cases, the ECJ applied the free movement provisions to private action 
notably when its aim was to bear on working conditions and access to 
employment136 or in the case of sport associations due to their powerful 
influence over the organization of professional sports.137 
In Viking Line, it is argued that the ECJ was willing to protect the economic 
freedom of the employer. As the Advocate General Maduro noted, “the 
possibility for a company to relocate to a Member State where its operating 
costs will be lower is pivotal to the pursuit of effective intra-Community [sic] 
trade”.138 A similar conclusion seems to be apposite in Laval.139 In this case, 
the ECJ accepted the horizontal direct effect of Article 49 EC (now 56 TFEU) 
by underscoring, based on the aforementioned case law, that rules which are 
designed to regulate collectively the provision of services cannot escape the 
scope of the freedom to provide services by the simple fact that they are not 
public in nature.140 Confirming its stance in Viking Line, the ECJ again appeared 
to balance the conflicting rights (fundamental freedom against fundamental 
rights to protect workers against social dumping) in favour of free movement. 
In this case, however, it was more eloquent than in Viking Line. Whilst in the 
latter, the ECJ suggested that it is for the national court to undertake the 
proportionality test, in Laval the ECJ, in light of the severity of the means 
132. For an excellent account of this issue, see A.G. Maduro’s Opinion in Viking Line: Case 





136. Angonese, cited supra note 128; and Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund, [2003] 
ECR I-4135.
137. For the relevant case law, see supra note 122.
138. See A.G. Maduro’s Opinion in Viking Line, cited supra note 132, point 57; the ECJ con-
firmed this view in para 72 of the judgment.
139. Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767.
140. Ibid., para 98.
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chosen by the domestic trade union (i.e. a blockade of sites), decided to 
undertake the proportionality test itself, in order to conclude that it was not 
met, based on the safety net already provided by Directive 96/71 on posting 
of workers and on the obscurity or the absence of any provisions at all at a 
national level specifying the obligations of employers with respect to minimum 
pay. However, it would be erroneous to consider that the ECJ adopted a human-
rights- or labour-unfriendly stance. Arguably, the rulings of the ECJ are strictly 
fact-specific and should not be used to draw more general conclusions as to 
social protection within the Union. On the other hand, it would be safe to say 
that the ECJ is not prepared to overrule light-heartedly a restriction on the 
fundamental freedoms, notably when their application may ensure an optimal 
allocation of resources throughout the Union.
It follows from the previous discussion that the ECJ, by rather focusing 
on the activity at stake, is determined to outlaw any provision of any nature 
which could be capable of preventing or deterring an EU citizen from leaving 
her home country to exercise her right to freedom of movement. Any signal of 
disadvantaging nationals of another Member State in the territory of a given 
Member State, which subsequently impedes or renders less attractive the use 
of the Treaty’s constitutional rights, can be sufficient to trigger the application 
of the free movement provisions.141 
In Mobistar, for instance, the ECJ submitted that rules which have the effect 
of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult 
than the provision of services within one Member State are to be outlawed.142 
When exercise of fundamental rights is in conflict with the exercise of the 
freedom of movement, the Court will attempt to strike a balance based on 
the facts of the case and the interests at stake – neither fundamental rights 
nor fundamental freedoms are absolute.143 The Court is willing to take up this 
daunting task, absent any serious attempt by the State to resolve the matter 
in a satisfactory manner. The Court’s case law hints at the need for a more 
pro-active and reflexive reaction from the State when such issues are raised 
to avoid recourse to judicial means. Indeed, Member States can and should 
interfere with private rules through appropriate legislation or court decisions 
141. Case C-442/02, CaixaBank France, [2004] ECR I-8961, para 11.
142. Case C-545/03, Mobistar, [2005] ECR I-7723, para 30.
143. To corroborate this view, see Art. 52(1) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the Euro-
pean Union, which provides that: “[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
recognized by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be imposed only if 
they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”. See also A.G. Maduro’s Opinion in Viking 
Line, cited supra note 132, point 23.
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at any time. Given the risk of bias that may characterize private rules, such 
State intervention may become essential in restoring the balance of rights and 
obligations or complying with the obligations enshrined in the Treaty.
Interestingly, however, this may not be the end of the story for our purposes 
of examining the consistency with EU law of restrictions based on CoC. Even if 
non-discriminatory, a restriction on free movement cannot be sustained unless 
it pursues an EU-consistent legitimate objective, is justified by overriding 
reasons of public interest and complies with the proportionality principle. In 
Gebhard,144 and more recently in Wouters, the Court found or implied that 
national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the 
right to free movement can be justified, based, inter alia, on professional ethics 
considerations. Hence, the protection of professional ethics can be considered 
as a legitimate, overriding reason of public interest.145 It follows that when 
examining the compliance of CoC rules with EU rules on fundamental 
freedoms, the rules of professional conduct and ethics will be examined as a 
justification of the violation of free movement rules. 
Therefore, what would seem to be of paramount importance under this 
constellation is the extent to which the measure that allegedly substantiates 
or is based on a rule of ethics and conduct complies with the principle of 
proportionality, that is, it is suitable for the attainment of the objective pursued 
and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.146 Again, 
government rules may override compliance with such ethical rules. For 
instance, in the case of an organized campaign to combat illegal activities, 
such as money laundering, limitations to the principles of confidentiality and 
professional secrecy can be considered as proportionate and justified.147
144. Gebhard, cited supra note 19.
145. Or rules justified by the “general good”. See also Cases 33/74, Van Binsbergen, [1974] 
ECR 1299, para 12; and 71/76, Thieffry, [1977] ECR 765, para 12. See, by analogy, in regard to 
the reputation of a given services sector. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, [1995] ECR I-1141, 
paras. 42–44.
146. See, inter alia, Bosman, cited supra note 122, para 104. This proportionality test will be 
much more flexible in cases where the professionals at issue are the agents of protecting an 
important policy objective such as public health within the sphere of competences retained to the 
Member States. See Joined Cases C-171 & 172/07, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes, [2009] 
ECR I-4171, judgment of 19 May 2009, nyr. In this case, the Court suggested, inter alia, that the 
double nature of the pharmacists, i.e. the fact that they operate a pharmacy not only to make 
profit, but also as professionals bound by the rules of law and professional conduct, may justify 
a restriction allowing only to pharmacists to own and operate pharmacies. According to the 
Court, moderating factors inherent in their function make them special when compared to non-
pharmacists.
147. See Ordre des barreaux francophones and germanophones and others, cited supra note 
62, and the Opinion of A.G. Maduro in this case.
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5. The relevance of EU competition rules
Rules of professional conduct laid down in CoC come within the scope of EU 
competition law, as they organize and influence the exercise of a given profes-
sion.148 The compatibility of rules contained in CoC with EU law may be 
contentious when examined through the lens of competition law. Such an 
examination is however necessary to ensure that equally competitive conditions 
are offered to the economic operators active in the EU market, and that rules 
enshrined in CoC do not prescribe certain types of behaviour which have anti-
competitive effects.149
 There are five principal categories of rules relating to professional services 
that may be inconsistent with EU competition rules. These relate to: price 
 fixing; recommended prices and minimum fees;150 restrictions relating to 
 commercial communications; entry requirements and reserved rights; and 
regulations relating to legal form, ownership and multi-disciplinary  practices.151 
In several instances, professional bodies have included these types of restric-
tions in their CoC and linked them to the proper conduct of the profession or 
the interests of the consumer.152 Empirical studies suggest that the theoretical 
perception alleging that a causal link exists between heavy regulation and bet-
ter quality of professional services supplied does not hold.153 Economic theory 
further demonstrates that delegating regulatory authority, i.e. granting to a 
professional body a monopoly right to self-regulate the pursuit of a professional 
service and thus allowing it to restrict entry to the profession, would generate 
important economic rents in the form of excess revenues for the incumbents. 
Prices in this case will be higher without there being any indication of quality 
improvement. For instance, in Cipolla, the Commission argued that no causal 
link has been established between the setting of minimum levels of fees and a 
high qualitative standard of legal services.154 Therefore, it is worth examining 
the applicability of EU competition rules to the rules that a professional CoC 
may comprise.
 In Meca-Medina, the Court made it explicit that, even in the absence of 
economic activity, the non-application of the provisions on free movement 
148. Case T-144/99, Institut des mandataires agréés, [2001] ECR II-1087, para 64.
149. Case C-49/07, MOTOE, [2008] ECR I-4863, para 51.
150. See also recital 73 of the Directive.
151. European Commission, “Report on Competition in Professional Services”, COM(2004) 
83, 9 Feb. 2004, 3.
152. See, more recently, the Commission Decision of 24 June 2004 on the recommended 
prices for Belgian architects, case COMP/38.2549.
153. OECD, cited supra note 103.
154. Cipolla, cited supra note 67.
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does not exclude the application of Articles 81 and 82 (now 101 and 102 TFEU, 
respectively).155 Rather, a separate analysis should be undertaken to examine 
whether (1) the rules governing the activity are created by an undertaking; (2) 
this undertaking restricts competition or abuses its dominant position; and (3) 
this restriction or abuse affects intra-EU trade. 
 The concept of an undertaking under EU law is relative.156 In Wouters, the 
Court ruled that lawyers are undertakings within the meaning of the EU com-
petition law, as they offer services for remuneration, and bear the financial 
risks that failures may entail.157 By the same token, in CNSD158 customs agents 
were considered as undertakings, whereas in Pavlov159 medical specialist doc-
tors also came under this term. This would obviously apply to the overwhelm-
ing majority of professional service suppliers. Furthermore, à la Wouters, the 
professional body should be considered as an association of undertakings that 
adopts a collusive behaviour pursuant to Article 101 TFEU in that it influences 
the conduct of its members on the market in the relevant services sector and 
directs them to act in a particular manner when they carry their economic 
activity.160 Thus, rules created in the exercise of the body’s regulatory autonomy 
such as the adoption of CoC (or of certain rules therein such as those relating 
to advertising or minimum/maximum fees) constitute a decision adopted by 
an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.161 
 Like the concept of undertaking, the notion of an “association of undertak-
ings” is relative.162 Sufficient governmental involvement and mixed situations 
entailing public–private cooperation where the observance of pre-defined pub-
lic interest criteria is warranted shields the body governing professional con-
duct from the purview of Article 101.163 Nonetheless, the standard of review 
will be fairly strict in assessing the role of public authority in the measure 
under scrutiny. In Van Eycke, and later in Arduino, the ECJ clarified that a 
violation of Articles 10 and 81 EC (now 4(3) TEU and 101 TFEU, respectively) 
occurs (a) when a Member State divests its rules of legislative character through 
delegation to private economic actors of the responsibility to take decisions 
155. Meca-Medina, cited supra note 123, paras. 30–31.
156. Cf. Case C-41/90, Höfner and Elser, [1991] ECR I-1979.
157. Wouters, cited supra note 51, para 49. 
158. Case C-35/96, Commission v. Italy (CNSD), [1998] ECR I-3851, para 37.
159. Case C-180/98, Pavlov, [2000] ECR I-6451.
160. Wouters, cited supra note 51, paras. 63–64.
161. Ibid, para 71. Also Institut des mandataires agréés, cited supra note 148, para 62. Inter-
estingly, in this ruling, the General Court found that an outright prohibition of comparative 
advertising incorporated in a CoC can violate Art. 101 TFEU. Ibid., para 79.
162. See Vossestein’s annotation of Arduino and Wouters, 39 CML Rev. (2002), 853.
163. Case C-35/99, Arduino, [2002] ECR I-1529, paras. 37–39.
1082  Delimatsis CML Rev. 2010
affecting the economic sphere, or (b) when a Member State requires or even 
encourages collusive behaviour contrary to Article 101 or reinforces its 
effects.164
 Any activity, in turn, consisting of offering goods or services in a given 
market is deemed an economic activity.165 An association of undertakings can 
itself be an undertaking if it performs such an economic activity. An entity 
such as a professional association can partially exercise public authority and 
thus not come under the purview of the competition rules, but still be subject 
to the competition rules if it undertakes additional activities within a com-
petitive market on which a number of undertakings act in competition.166 
 However, entities whose activities are exclusively social or of public interest 
and are not pursued in competition with other economic agents in the relevant 
market are excluded from the scope of competition rules.167
 Decisions that affect trade between Member States168 and de facto or de jure 
prevent, restrict or distort intra-EU competition are void by virtue of Article 
101(2). The so-called intra-community clause is, again, interpreted broadly.169 
The relevant market can be the domestic market only or even certain regions 
thereof.170 This last element may be of particular importance for associations 
which are active at the sub-national level. Of particular importance is the 
attempt to identify those practices which are capable of constituting a threat 
to freedom of trade among Member States171 in a manner which might harm 
the attainment of the objectives of the single market, notably by partitioning 
of markets on a national basis or hindering the economic interpenetration in 
contrast to the objectives of the Treaty. In CNSD, the Court clarified that agree-
ments extending over the whole of the territory of a Member State have, by 
their very nature, such an effect.172
164. Ibid., para 35; and Case 267/86, Van Eycke, [1988] ECR 4769, para 16; also Mauri, 
cited supra note 25, paras. 29–37.
165. MOTOE, cited supra note 149, para 22; Case C-264/01, AOK Bundesverband, [2004] 
ECR I-2493, paras. 50, 58.
166. For instance, the city of Trier was deemed an undertaking. See Case C-475/99, 
Ambulanz Glöckner, [2001] ECR I-8089.
167. Case C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, [2006] ECR I-289, paras. 120–121. 
168. This is an autonomous criterion that needs to be assessed separately. See Joined Cases 
56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig, [1966] ECR 429. See also the Commission’s Guidelines on 
the effect on trade concept contained in Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. 2004, C 101/81.
169. Case C-295/04, Manfredi, [2006] ECR I-6619, para 42.
170. Ambulanz Glöckner, cited supra note 166, para 38.
171. Case law confirms that effects are essentially immaterial. See Case C-55/96, Job 
Centre, [1997] ECR I-7119, para 36.
172. Commission v. Italy (CNSD), cited supra note 158, para 48.
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 Nevertheless, these provisions do not aim to penalize every single agreement 
or decision that restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them. 
Article 101 is to be interpreted in a manner that accommodates EU or national 
policies which are non-economic in nature.173 Thus, courts should jux tapose 
the anti-competitive effects against the objectives of the agreements or deci-
sions and the overall context in which the agreements or decisions are con-
cluded or produce their effects. Furthermore, they should examine whether the 
consequences which restrict competition are in fact inherent in the pursuit of 
those objectives and are limited to what is necessary to ensure the proper 
conduct of the profession, as it is organized in the Member State at stake.174 In 
this analysis, then, the peculiarities of the domestic market and of the specific 
profession will have a central role.175 In Institut des mandataires agréés, for 
instance, the General Court opined that the rule enshrined in the CoC at stake 
had to be assessed against “its impact on the freedom of action of the members 
of the profession and on its organization and also on the recipients of the ser-
vices in question.”176
 In Wouters, the ECJ found that outright prohibitions of multidisciplinary 
practices in the legal profession are inconsistent with Article 101(1)(b) because 
they are liable to limit production and technical development,177 as they do not 
allow the exploitation of the one-stop-shop advantage, the supply of “full 
service” and the possible diminution of costs. However, the ECJ submitted 
that the rules at issue were designed to ensure the proper conduct of the profes-
sion and the sound administration of justice and therefore were justified and 
proportionate, thereby striking a balance between the anti-competitive 
 behaviour and the pursuit of non-economic legitimate objectives which may, 
however, have pro-competitive effects.178 By the same token, anti-doping rules, 
173. See Nazzini, “Article 81 EC between time present and time past: A normative critique 
of ‘restriction of competition’ in EU Law”, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 503. Contra Odudu, The 
Boundaries of EC Competition Law – The Scope of Article 81 (OUP, 2006). See also Case 
C-67/96, Albany, [1999] ECR I-5751, paras. 52–60.
174. Meca-Medina, cited supra note 123, paras. 42, 47; and Wouters, cited supra note 51, 
para 97. 
175. Cipolla, cited supra note 67, para 68.
176. Institut des mandataires agréés, cited supra note 148, para 65.
177. Wouters, cited supra note 51, para 90.
178. There is controversy as to whether the ECJ accepts the existence of a “rule of reason” 
under Art. 101(1) TFEU by adopting this reasoning, which suggests that it is necessary to weigh 
up the anti-competitive against the pro-competitive effects. See Manzini, “The European rule of 
reason: Crossing the sea of doubt”, 23 ECLR (2002), 392. Also Monti, “Article 81 and public 
policy”, 39 CML Rev. (2002), 1087. Such an interpretation also exemplifies a tendency to apply 
Art. 101 based on the methodology of jurisprudence relating to free movement. See O’Loughlin, 
“EC competition rules and free movement rules: An examination of the parallels and their fur-
therance by the ECJ Wouters Decision”, 24 ECLR (2003), 62. In Métropole, the General Court 
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while prima facie restrictive of competition, were justified because they were 
designed to ensure fair rivalry among athletes and complied with the principle 
of proportionality. State compulsion can also function as a defence under 
Article 101. It cannot, however, be invoked when the national law merely 
allows, encourages or makes it easier for undertakings or associations to engage 
in autonomous anti-competitive conduct.179
 It remains to be examined w hether, when adopting rules enshrined in CoC, 
the professional associations can act inconsistently with Article 102 TFEU 
relating to a dominant position.180 Importantly, in MOTOE, the Court clarified 
that an undertaking can, inter alia, acquire a dominant position when it is 
granted special or exclusive rights enabling it to determine whether and under 
what conditions other undertakings can have access to the relevant market and 
supply their services.181 It further found that Articles 82 and 86(1) (now 102 
and 106 TFEU, respectively) are violated when the fact that such rights within 
the meaning of Article 86(1) (now 106(1) TFEU) are granted is liable to create 
a risk of an abuse of a dominant position.182 
 By analogy, a professional association which has been granted the power to 
self-regulate the conditions of a given professional activity as well as the power 
to decide on the well-foundedness of the applications for authorization to 
exercise a given professional activity could be considered an undertaking to 
contended that a balancing of anti- and pro-competitive effects can only be accepted under the 
narrow confines of Art. 101(3) TFEU. Case T-112/99, Métropole télévision (M6), [2001] ECR 
II-2459, para 74. See also the Commission’s “Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty”, O.J. 2004, C 101/98, para 11. Nazzini argues that this type of balancing is different 
from the one under the Wouters test. Under Art. 81(1) EC, welfare-enhancing effects are to be 
balanced against welfare-reducing effects to estimate the net effect of the agreement on con-
sumer welfare. Under Art 81(3) EC, however, it is the net welfare-reducing effects that need to 
be balanced against productive efficiencies. Thus, the exception of Art. 101(3) TFEU is not 
deprived of its meaning. Nazzini, op. cit. supra note 173, 519; but see Jones and Sufrin, EC 
Competition Law, 3rd ed. (OUP, 2008), pp. 267–268. Arguably, the ECJ was convinced that the 
rules at issue in Wouters were welfare-enhancing and thus pro-competitive (paras. 85, 91–93). It 
is worth noting that the US Supreme Court found that ethical rules can promote competition and 
thus fall within the rule of reason: see National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, 435 US 
679 (1978). See also the Opinion of the A.G. Léger in Wouters, cited supra note 51, para 112. 
Other commentators take the view that the Wouters case law is a reflection of the “ancillary 
restraints” concept, i.e. restraints on conduct which appear to restrict competition nevertheless 
do not infringe Art. 101(1) TFEU if they are ancillary to some legitimate purpose. See, inter alia, 
Whish, Competition Law, 6th ed. (OUP, 2009), pp. 126 et seq.
179. Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi, [2003] ECR I-8055, paras. 52–56.
180. For this concept, see Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207, 
para 65. Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU can be applied simultaneously. See Case 322/81, Michelin, 
[1983] ECR 3461, para 30.
181. MOTOE, cited supra note 149, para 38.
182. Ibid., para 50; also Höfner and Elser, cited supra note 156, para 29.
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which a Member State has granted special rights within the meaning of Article 
106(1). However, this would presuppose that a professional association that 
has previously been considered as an association of undertakings is also an 
undertaking itself for the purposes of Article 102. As noted earlier, economic 
activity is a precondition for the applicability of Article 102. A professional 
association, however, does not carry out an economic activity coming within 
this provision.183
 Alternatively, Article 102 can apply if it can be proven that there is a col-
lective dominant position where several undertakings which are legally inde-
pendent of each other present themselves to act together on a particular market 
as a collective entity.184 As all professionals can be regarded as undertakings 
within the meaning of EU competition rules, Article 102 could arguably apply 
in the case of a highly concentrated and homogeneous profession such as 
accountancy if it can be ascertained that economic links exist between the 
undertakings or professional service suppliers which enable them to act 
together independently of their competitors, their customers and consumers.185 
In Wouters, the Court rejected the applicability of Article 102 in the case of 
the legal profession, arguing that lawyers “are not sufficiently linked to each 
other to adopt the same conduct on the market with the result that competition 
between them is eliminated”, and that the legal profession “is highly hetero-
geneous and is characterized by a high degree of internal competition” without 
sufficient structural links between lawyers.186 Again, even if a collective dom-
inant position is upheld, it needs to be demonstrated that abuse of such a posi-
tion has occurred, as clarified in Piau.187
6. Conclusion
Our analysis above demonstrated that the ECJ, while well known as the most 
prominent trust-building institution of the EU, has adopted a lenient and fairly 
deferential approach when examining arguments of ethics, professional secrecy, 
integrity and reputation of the profession and other qualitative elements that 
CoC should aim to preserve and enhance. This approach is coupled with a 
country- and sector-specific proportionality test which is focused on the precise 
183. Wouters, cited supra note 51, para 112.
184. Joined Cases C-395/96 & 396/96, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA, [2000] 
ECR I-1365, para 36.
185. Ibid., para 42; and Case T-193/02, Piau, [2005] ECR II-209, para 111.
186. Wouters, cited supra note 51, paras. 113–114.
187. Piau, cited supra note 185, para 117.
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traits of the market and the nature of the profession and its inherent character-
istics. More flexible solutions adopted in other countries will not automatically 
render disproportionate the solutions adopted in the Member States in  question. 
However, the ECJ, as demonstrated in Laval, is ready to condemn palpable 
cases of unjustified distrust.
 Building trust is a macro-process deeply rooted in the history of European 
integration and a continuous challenge for such a diverse region in terms of 
economic strength, regulatory approaches, or constitutional and cultural 
 background. In the end, this process forms an integral part of the telos of the 
European adventure. However, it is utopian to believe that safe means risk-free. 
Nor can trust be equated to trustworthiness. 
 Be this as it may, the medium- to long-term effect of the Services Directive 
is expected to be utterly positive. The implementation of the Directive should 
bring new dynamics to the creation of effective CoC and the building of trust 
among the peoples of the Union. CoC have been used as a vehicle for intro-
ducing several requirements and conditions applied to professionals to fore-
close the relevant market and increase the rents for the incumbents over the 
years. Although it was correctly pointed out that CoC create expectations for 
third parties, the unpalatable truth is that on their own they cannot result in 
consistently improved professional behaviour.188
 Among several provisions of the Directive that call for reform, Article 15 
provides that self-regulating professional bodies have to evaluate several 
restrictions enshrined in domestic CoC regarding business structures and legal 
form; fixed pricing; or territorial restrictions. The need for a revision of restric-
tions on commercial communications is also underscored. According to the 
Directive, some of these types of measures, including commercial communica-
tions, should form an integral part of any attempt to draw up CoC at EU level 
for them to be meaningful. The task of creating such CoC appears to be daunt-
ing, as will be their implementation once they are adopted at EU level. The 
Directive specifies that Member States will take accompanying measures 
encouraging professional associations to implement at national level the pan-
European CoC. 
 As another piece of evidence of the bottom-up approach adopted, the role 
of national professional associations is essential at each and every stage of this 
process, from the decision on the content of the pan-European CoC to the 
surveillance of their implementation and the potential application of disciplin-
ary sanctions. While the Directive does not specify whether the CoC drawn 
up at EU level will be binding, the long-term preferred constellation is obvious 
188. Higgs-Kleyn and Kapelianis, op. cit. supra note 60, 365.
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from the structure of the Directive: initially voluntary, the CoC adopted at EU 
level will be transposed at the national level (replacing the current national 
CoC, if needed) and gradually become binding, thereby ensuring a minimum 
level of homogeneity and acceptable professional conduct across the Union 
with regard to issues such as ethics, professional secrecy, integrity,  impartiality, 
business structure, or advertising.189
189. Admittedly, our conclusion is reminiscent of the graduated normativity theory, which 
contends that a continuum exists between hard and soft law. See Chinkin, “Normative develop-
ment in the international legal system” in Shelton (Ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role 
of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (OUP, 2000), p. 32.
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